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1. Introduction
The economic analysis of law succeeded more than even its most optimistic 
founders expected. Why? Lawyers lacked a scientific theory to predict the effects 
of sanctions upon behavior, developed from economics after 1960 (Cooter, 1995). 
In other words, lawyer–economists have succeeded in expanding the explanation 
of individual market behavior to the law by providing to the analysis of the law 
the seminal insight that people respond to incentives: ‘Just as markets charge 
prices for commodities, laws impose sanctions on acts’ (Korobkin & Ulen, 2000, 
p. 1055). In order to be able to study the legal implications of viewing law as a 
series of incentives, assumptions have to be made about the consequences of those 
incentives to the people subject to the legal system. To satisfy this need, lawyer–
economists imported from rational choice theory the assumption that individuals 
maximize their preferences as efficiently as possible, given existing constraints.
However, law and economics’ initial success has been under threat for some time 
now. Why is that? How has this threat been responded to? And how convincing 
are these responses? An important reason why law and economics is under threat 
is that empirical research has demonstrated that the functioning of the law can-
not be well understood on the basis of the assumption of the rational actor and 
that policies based on this assumption are likely to be flawed. Since this criticism 
goes to the heart of law and economics, it has not gone unnoticed. Three responses 
can be distinguished. Whereas the first response maintains that the limitations 
attributed to the rational actor are grossly exaggerated and can easily be incor-
porated in rational choice theory, the second response welcomes the criticism 
and sees it as an opportunity to come up with an integrative theory of law and 
behavior. The third response also takes the criticism seriously but replaces the 
aspiration to come up with such an integrative theory with an approach that is 
sensitive to context-specific conceptions of rationality. It will be argued that the 
first two responses fall short, while the third response offers a promising way to 
go forward.
The next section reviews the empirical research that challenges the assump-
tion of the rational actor when it comes to law and behavior. Subsequently, the 
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three responses to the critique on this assumption are discussed and evaluated. 
The paper ends with a summarizing conclusion.
2. Challenging the Assumption of the Rational Actor
2.1 Types of Human Behavior
A rapidly expanding body of foremost psychological empirical studies, which are 
often subsumed under the heading of behavioral law and economics, has criti-
cized the assumption that individuals make rational decisions. In essence, behav-
ioral law and economics is defined in opposition to the assumption of the rational 
actor: ‘it is economics minus the assumption that people are rational maximizers 
of their satisfaction’ (Posner, 1998, p. 1552). However, behavioral lawyer–econo-
mists continue to use rationality as their main point of reference. They commonly 
refer to ‘bounded rationality’, ‘bounded will-power’, and ‘bounded self-interest’. 
This suggests, although bounded, that rationality is still the standard. In this 
sense, Kelman (1998, p. 1580) is right in stating that behavioral law and econom-
ics and rational choice theory stand together in ‘irreconcilable mutual depend-
ence’, ‘bound together in a form of rhetorical duet or ritualized dance’. This means 
that, on the one hand, the behavioral law and economics movement has criticized 
the assumption of the rational actor in legal analysis but, on the other hand, has 
treated other types of behavior as a residual category.
The typology of human behavior introduced by Max Weber (1925), one of the 
founding fathers of sociology, offers an escape from the limitations that are posed 
by sticking to the rational actor as the main point of reference. In his typology 
instrumental rationality is but one among several types of behavior. It pertains to 
behavior that focuses on optimizing the consequences or utility of individuals’ 
decisions, in the sense of choosing the best option as judged by the agent (Elster, 
2007, p. 193). This is also the type of behavior rational choice theory focuses on 
(Boudon, 1998, 2003). The other types concern traditional and affective behavior, 
and substantive rationality. Affective behavior is infused by emotion and enacted 
without premeditation. Traditional behavior originates from prevailing habits that 
are internalized to such an extent that an individual no longer realizes why she 
always performs the same actions under certain circumstances. As is the case with 
affective behavior, there is no premeditation about the potential consequences or 
utility of the act. Substantive rationality arises from the conviction that a certain 
action possesses intrinsic value (‘Eigenwert’), independent of utility or result. 
Executing the act is the goal in itself. ‘The captain who is convinced that he owes 
it to his honor to jump a sinking ship last, behaves substantively rational. When 
he would abuse his authority to be the first to enter a rescue boat, others would 
see him as a person without honor. And this knowledge would be unbearable’ (De 
Jong, 1997, p. 116, translated from Dutch). Max Weber’s  typology provides a use-
ful heuristic device to show that each of the other three types of behavior are 
indispensable to understand the functioning of the law and that policy recom-
mendations can be derived from these insights.
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2.2 Emotions
There are scholars who have attempted to model the place of emotions in the law 
or have addressed the ‘appropriateness’ of various emotions for the substantive 
law (Blumenthal, 2005). In principle, emotions have no place in the concept of 
the rational decision maker. As far as emotions have been taken into account by 
rational choice scholars, they have implicitly or explicitly assumed ‘that emotional 
states are conscious and controllable, that people are aware of and can predict 
their emotions, and that as a partial result “people can cultivate their emotions”’ 
(Blumenthal, 2005, p. 161). Yet the assumptions that people are able to predict 
and control their emotions have both proven problematic.
As regards people’s capacity to predict their emotions, empirical research has 
shown that although people are relatively adept at knowing which emotions they 
will experience and whether they will be positive or negative, they are surpris-
ingly inaccurate at predicting the intensity and the duration of those emotions. 
( Blumenthal, 2005, p. 167). For instance, through a process of ‘hedonic adapta-
tion,’ victims of traumatic experiences are able to return to a more normal expe-
rience of emotion sooner than might be expected. This inability to accurately 
predict future emotional states may lead, for example, to overcompensation for 
noneconomic losses such as ‘pain and suffering’, ‘mental anguish’, or ‘loss of (or 
“lost”) enjoyment of life’ in a civil jury system if jurors consistently overpredict 
the degree of emotional distress a victim will suffer (Blumenthal, 2005, p. 183). 
Besides, research has demonstrated that people are limited in their ability to 
control their emotions. At sufficient levels of intensity, emotions can overwhelm 
cognitive processing altogether. ‘Under the influence of intense emotions,  people 
often report themselves as being (or having been) “out of control” or “acting 
against their own self-interest”’ (Mitchell, 2002, n. 95). For example, anger or 
pride may lead to increased frequencies of trials, particularly when aroused by 
parties’ beliefs and expectations about the other party’s behavior, beliefs, and 
emotions (Blumenthal, 2005, p. 205). The consequence of this is more trials than 
would be predicted by the rational choice model, unless steps are taken to miti-
gate the parties’ evaluative biases.
Taking into account people’s limited abilities to predict and control emotions has 
two potential implications for legal policymakers. First, ‘one way to address some 
of the concerns related to the limited ability to predict emotions would be to admit 
expert evidence on affective forecasting research, as well as coping mechanisms 
more generally, during the damages phase of civil trials that involve damages for 
emotional distress’ (Blumenthal, 2005, p. 187). Second, the importance of emo-
tions for subjects to the law provides support for alternative forms of dispute 
resolution, allowing litigants room to ventilate and deal with their own emotions 
and with the emotions of their opponents. This is congruent with the modern 
trend in civil litigation toward mandatory settlement conferences, court-ordered 
mediation, and nonbinding arbitration.
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2.3 Tradition
Traditional behavior is relevant for legal scholarship because it shows that past 
behaviors can affect current choices. The fact that past behavior often increases 
the likelihood that individuals will act in the same way in the future poses a 
problem for law and economics. After all, economists employing rational choice 
theory assume either that choices an actor has made in the past will not affect 
his current preference structure or that yesterday’s choices will negatively affect 
today’s choices, owing to the application of the concept of declining marginal util-
ity (Korobkin & Ulen, 2000).1
This positive effect of past choices on current ones can result, among others, from 
people’s habit of simplifying their tasks by using rules of thumb, or heuristics. For 
example, judges reason by reference to past cases; jury judgments about damage 
awards are likely to be based on anchors, even arbitrary ones, such as the plaintiff 
demand; and people tend to think that events are more likely if an example is read-
ily called to mind or ‘available.’ Consequently, media coverage of major incidents 
fuels demand for risk regulation (Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 1998ab). Reverting to 
earlier decisions can turn into traditional behavior when these decisions solidify 
into recurring decision patterns that are more or less taken for granted. The fact 
that lawyers—public defenders, prosecutors, judges—constantly decide about 
individual cases that are similar in many respects (Lipsky, 1980) gives them the 
opportunity to incorporate experiences with the consequences of prior decisions 
in current decisions (Gilboy, 1992). Such use of prior knowledge is accompanied 
by the normalization, standardization, and simplification of decision-making; in 
other words by the routinized use of mental shortcuts. In his classic study ‘ Normal 
Crimes’, Sudnow (1965, p. 267) indeed shows that when a public defender ‘puts 
questions to the defendant he is less concerned with recording nuances of the 
instant event […], than with establishing its similarity with “events of this sort”. 
That similarity is established, not by discovering statutorily relevant events of 
the present cases, but by locating the event in a sociologically constructed class 
of “such cases”.’ Likewise, criminal judges recognize and respond to the cues and 
expectations provided by decisions made earlier in the criminal process and pre-
dict decisions downstream (Tata & Hutton, 1998, p. 353). As a result, cases are 
not entirely evaluated on the basis of their own merits but are connected to regu-
lar behavioral patterns or with what is consciously or unconsciously conceived of 
as familiar and self-evident.
A broad implication for legal policy that can be derived from acknowledging the 
positive relationship between past and present behaviors is that policymakers 
should realize that traditional behavior is likely to be much more difficult to 
manipulate than rational choice theory would predict (Korobkin & Ulen, 2000, 
p. 1116).
1 But see Becker (1996 chapter 6), although Becker wrongly regards traditional behavior as 
instrumentally rational because the former is not premeditated, whereas the latter is (see 
Elster, 1986, p. 4).
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2.4 Substantive Rational Behavior
A trite but nonetheless highly relevant finding for legal scholarship is that under 
certain conditions individuals subordinate their self-interest to compliance with 
social norms. Although compliance with social norms is not always easy to dis-
tinguish from traditional behavior, especially not when norms are widely shared 
and more or less taken for granted, most important for our argument is that the 
sacrifice of self-interest to compliance with social norms contradicts a version of 
rational choice theory that assumes individuals act selfishly (for other versions of 
rational choice theory, see Korobkin & Ulen, 2000, p. 1061).2
According to rational choice theory, the more the risks of being penalized for 
violating laws exceed the benefits of doing so, the more individuals are inclined 
to comply. In a review article, Robbennolt (2015) confirms that financial incen-
tives influence the inclination to behave unethically, but she also concludes that 
individuals value their moral self-image and that this concern moderates other 
incentives for unethical behavior. ‘Thus, even when there are financial incentives 
for deviant behavior and there is little or no chance of being caught, not every-
one violates rules, and those who do tend only to do so a little bit’ (Robbennolt, 
2015, p. 81). Individuals look to others to figure out how to behave ethically, 
particularly in ambiguous circumstances. Furthermore, individuals are particu-
larly inclined to mimic a peer’s ethical behavior when the peer is a member of the 
individual’s in-group or when there is otherwise a feeling of social closeness with 
that peer, or when the influence comes in the form of direction from an authority 
figure. In sum, there are many situations in which individuals act or abstain from 
acts because they deem this morally right or because they believe this is expected 
of them, independent of the utility or results of this behavior in terms of self- 
interest.
Korobkin and Ulen derive potential policy implications from the insight that 
individual behavior motivated by social norms differs from what would be in the 
actors’ direct self-interest. First, policymakers can decide to employ law to violate 
inefficient or undesirable social norms, to support social norms, or to shape them. 
‘For example, by banning the selling of babies, the selling of bodily organs, or the 
selling of sex, the government might reinforce a social norm that neither the body 
nor its parts should be commodified’ (Korobkin & Ulen, 2000, p. 1133). Second, 
lawmakers may fall back on the principle of noninterference by relying on norms 
to be self-enforcing, or by codifying the prevailing norms, thus supporting the 
prevailing norms with the enforcement power of the state.
2.5 Conclusion
While law and economics start from the assumption that individuals make 
instrumentally rational decisions, Max Weber’s typology of human behavior can 
be used to classify empirical studies that have demonstrated that the functioning 
of the law cannot be understood well without taking into account the three other 
2 As will be argued in Section 5, the rebuttal by rational choice theorists that norm-compliant or 
altruistic behavior can in fact be reduced to selfish behavior falls short.
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types of behavior. Even where law seeks directly to regulate economic relations, 
‘other matters [than instrumental rationality, PM] are likely to be implicated: 
values and beliefs (for example, shaping understandings of and attitudes to eco-
nomic activity and state regulation); practices and customs arising from working 
together in a common business environment; and emotional allegiances or rejec-
tions touching on business decisions (for example, regarding choices of clients or 
trading partners, or dealings in certain nations)’ (Cotterrell, 2017, p. 29/30). This 
failure to properly understand the functioning of the law based on the assump-
tion of the rational actor has led to this assumption being questioned on empirical 
and normative grounds. Extending the premise of utility maximizing from the 
economic sphere of wealth creation in competitive markets of private goods to the 
law by using the analogy of conceiving legal instruments as incentives directing 
behavior has been criticized for lacking empirical realism and explanatory power 
(Zafirovski, 2018). As individuals often do not behave (only) as utility maximiz-
ers, the normative value of legal institutions that are designed on this premise 
has also been questioned (Somers, 1998). Ignoring systematic irrationality on the 
part of the executioners and subjects of these instruments will lead the designer 
to miscalculate the consequences of these instruments: ‘Why should institutions 
that would be best if everyone were rational recommend themselves to individu-
als who know that they themselves – the future inhabitants of those institutions 
– are less than fully rational?’ (Kornhauser, 2002, p. 33). Three responses can 
be distinguished to the critiques on the assumption of the rational actor. These 
responses vary in their implications for the rational choice theory that initially 
determined the success of law and economics.
3. Denouncing Behavioral Law and Economics
The proponents of the first response defend the claim that the limitations attrib-
uted to rational choice theory are grossly exaggerated. Their main argument is 
that the actions that appear to be noninstrumentally rational—tradition, emo-
tion, and substantive rationality—are actually instrumental at a deeper level 
(Boudon, 1998, p. 818). This conversion from noninstrumental to instrumental is 
obtained by introducing the postulate that, contrary to appearances, actions are 
the product of self-interest. Richard Posner (1998), one of the founding fathers 
of law and economics, defends this position in an influential article from 1998.
In this article, Posner conceives of emotional behavior as part of instrumental 
rationality rather than as an independent behavioral type. He argues ‘that pref-
erences cannot be divorced from emotion, or emotion from their stimuli, and so 
instrumental reasoning cannot be thought pervaded with irrationality merely 
because a frequent goal of such reasoning is a preference that we would not have 
if we were not emotional beings’ (Posner, 1998). On the basis of this argument, 
he defends rational choice theory against the outcomes of so-called ‘ultimatum 
games.’ In ultimatum games, donors are given a money amount and are asked to 
allocate a share of the amount that they are given to their recipient. If the recipient 
accepts the share, then both donor and recipient go home with these respective 
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allocations, but if the recipient declines then both parties go home with nothing. 
The finding that recipients usually prefer to remain empty-handed rather than to 
accept a derisory offer questions the assumption of the rational actor. After all, 
for a rational actor, anything is better than nothing. Posner rebuts by arguing 
that refusing insultingly low offers can be interpreted in terms of a remnant of 
adaptive evolutionary behavior: ‘[i]nability to make a credible threat to retaliate 
renders a person virtually defenseless in a prelegal, prepolitical society’ (Posner, 
1998, p. 1562). Finding the courage to retaliate would require a state of emotional 
arousal. Allegedly, the emotions connected to the ingrained inclination to retali-
ate causes recipients to decline insultingly low offers in ultimatum games. What 
appears to be nonrational post hoc is to be viewed rational ex ante: [Thus] ‘having 
an unshakable commitment to retaliate may be ex ante rational by lowering the 
risk of being a victim of aggression, even though, if the risk materializes, acting 
on the commitment will then (that is, ex post) become irrational’ (Posner, 1998, 
p.1565).
In relation to traditional behavior, Posner argues that some critics still attribute to 
rational choice theory the assumption that individuals decide on the basis of com-
plete information. However, he believes this assumption has long been aborted by 
rational choice theory. Precisely because collecting information is expensive, it is 
efficient to resort to rules of thumb. This explains why the fact that an actor acted 
in a certain way in the past often increases the likelihood that he will act in the 
same way in the future. As such, for example, the availability bias – the propensity 
to overestimate the relevance of salient or memorable incidents at the expense of 
the accurate prediction of the probability of future events – can be conceived of as 
a rational reduction of complexity and uncertainty. Absent other information, it 
is smart to trust in indirect signals such as the availability of  salient or  memorable 
incidents. For the same reason it is also rational to adjust one’s own behavior to 
that of others. ‘Habit-formation is [simply] one way in which “learning by doing” 
works; tasks are performed more quickly and with less effort when they become 
habitual’ (Posner, 1998). In other words, traditional behavior is a means to make 
efficient choices and to reduce complexity and uncertainty.
Posner reduces substantive rational behavior to instrumental rationality by fall-
ing back on evolutionary biology again:
Inclusive fitness, defined as maximizing the number of copies of one’s genes 
by maximizing the number of creatures carrying them, is greatly enhanced 
by his having a proclivity to help his relatives, and so it is plausible to sup-
pose that this proclivity evolved as an adaptive mechanism. [...] Nowadays 
we interact a great deal with strangers. But our instincts are easily fooled 
when confronted with conditions to which human beings never had a chance 
to adapt biologically. [...] Voting, giving to charities, and refraining from lit-
tering, in circumstances in which there is neither visible reward for these 
cooperative behaviors nor visible sanctions for defection, may illustrate an 
instinctual, and as it were biologically mistaken, generalization of cooper-
ation from small-group interactions, in which altruism is rewarded (hence 
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reciprocal) and failures to reciprocate punished, to large-group interactions 
in which the prospects of reward and punishment are so slight that cooper-
ation ceases to be rational. […] We can see how bringing evolutionary biol-
ogy into the picture enables the concept of rationality to be enlarged to cover 
phenomena [such as altruism and fairness] that [Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler] 
classify as irrational (Posner, 1998, p. 1561).
4. Why Denouncing Behavioral Law and Economics Falls Short
In short, many findings put forward by behavioral law and economics with the 
aim of criticizing the assumed rational actor instead are treated as confirmations 
of the very same rational actor by Posner. Nonetheless, he realizes that doing so is 
risky when he writes: ‘Of course, enriching the rational-choice model runs a risk 
of explaining nothing by explaining everything’ (Posner, 1998, p. 1567). What he 
may mean by this is that ‘enriching’ rational choice theory implies that the concept 
of instrumental rationality is stretched to such an extent that it can no longer be 
distinguished from other types of behavior. Where does instrumental rationality 
start, and where do emotions, traditions, and substantive rationality end?
Furthermore, underlying Posner’s argument is the assumption that the three 
other types of behavior merely support instrumental rationality. Remarkably, he 
altogether overlooks the possibility that the reverse may be true, without sub-
stantiating his ranking order anywhere. After all, it is more plausible to assume 
that emotions dominate rationality than to assume the reverse. What human 
beings reflect upon and think about is emotionally loaded. Neurophysiologically, 
all information first passes the emotional part of the brains and only subse-
quently, after being emotionally loaded, enters the parts of the brain that execute 
planning, mental imagination, etc. The connections from the emotion parts of 
the brain to the ratio parts of the brain are more extensive and faster than are 
the reverse connections (Weenink, 2009). Therefore, assuming that other types 
of behavior are secondary to instrumental rationality is based on nothing else 
than the wish to uphold instrumental rationality as the ultimate type of behavior 
(Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 1998b, p. 1593/4).
One way to refute this criticism of overstretching the concept of instrumental 
rationality is by treating reasons, by principle, as unknowable (Boudon, 1998, 
p. 819). On the basis of this positivist epistemology, researchers such as Posner 
postulate to rely only on observable human behavior, or what economists des-
ignate as revealed preferences (see also Schroeder, 2001). The only thing that 
 matters is whether or not theories incorporating this postulate reproduce cor-
rectly in the observed data (Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 1998b, p. 1599). The rea-
sons  people give for their own actions are deemed as completely irrelevant.3 
3 It is ironic that Friedman and Posner take a theory rooted in a radical individualistic philosophy 
and a desire to understand human behavior and purport to remove individual psychology from 
it (Schroeder, 2001).
Mascini.indd   8 26/09/2018   11:45:43
This article from Law and Method is published by Boom juridisch and made available to anonieme bezoeker
Responses of Law and Economics to the Threat of Its Initial Success
Law and Method 9
For  example, if a player in an ultimatum game indicates that the only reason for 
rejecting a derisory offer was pure indignation or the definite conviction that the 
offer was principally unfair, then Posner knows it was ‘really’ because she did not 
want to give the impression to her opponent she was weak. ‘However, at this point, 
the rational choice theorist should explain the “false consciousness” she attrib-
utes to the actor’ (Boudon, 1998, p. 819). Why does the subject think she acted 
out of emotion, habit, or conviction while she really did for instrumental reasons? 
Boudon (1998, p. 819) maintains that people’s motivations for their behavior can 
be reconstructed. To this reconstruction he attributes the status of a theory that 
can be confronted with data. Boudon may be overly optimistic in assuming that 
the reconstruction of motivations can reveal the causes of behavior. After all, 
it has been firmly established that people have little or no direct introspective 
access to higher order cognitive processes such as ‘thinking,’ ‘affective appraisal,’ 
and ‘action systems.’ Rather, their reports on their cognitive processes, that is, 
on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, are based on 
a priori, often culturally accepted implicit causal theories or judgments about 
the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response 
(Nisbett & DeCamp Wilson, 1977, p. 231). Still, when researchers rely exclusively 
on observable behavioral patterns they simply cannot know whether or not their 
interpretations of these patterns are congruent with the manner in which people 
interpret their own behavior (Fuhse, 2009), nor can they account for potential 
discrepancies.
A second problem connected to ignoring reasons motivating actions is that this 
renders it possible to define completely opposing behaviors as instrumentally 
rational. This problem is present, for example, in relation to behavioral studies 
showing people’s leaning to attribute more importance to losses than to gains. 
Whereas Posner attributes loss aversion to a profitable evolutionary survival 
mechanism, there is a long tradition in economics of arguing that competition or 
evolution will drive out precisely those people who show loss aversions because 
they do not do what they are supposed to as rational actors. After all, standard 
reasoning in economics is that it is rational to ignore sunk costs, meaning that 
irreversible past actions should not influence current choices. This means both 
loss aversion and its absence can be interpreted in terms of adaptive evolutionary 
behavior. ‘It is difficult to see what conclusions should be drawn from the fact that 
evolution can be shown to produce a behavior – loss aversion – and the absence 
of that behavior’ (Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 1998b, p. 1600). In fact, resorting to 
revealed preferences makes rational choice theory incapable of generating predic-
tions at all because whatever happens can be said to have been a result of the rel-
evant utility function, constructed ex post (Arcuri, 2008; Schroeder, 2001). Such 
post hoc explanations do not help the policymaker who wants to know before-
hand what is to be expected from legal instruments and who will not be interested 
in what an instrumentally rational actor would do, knowing such an actor does 
not exist in many situations (Korobkin & Ulen, 2000).
A third problem connected to the attempt to conceive of other types of behavior as 
instrumental rationality at a deeper level is that it requires auxiliary  assumptions 
to do so. Posner argues that altruistic behavior that does not serve a foreseeable 
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self-interest is to be seen as a residual of biological instincts once needed to pass 
on one’s own genes and reproduce. Nowhere does Posner substantiate the claim 
that misguided instincts steer our behavior. Not even does he clarify how this 
claim can be tested at all (Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, 1998b). On top of that, it is 
superfluous to make this additional claim; ‘a behavioral approach to the economic 
analysis of law can proceed whether or not the evolutionary account is right’ (Jolls, 
Sunstein & Thaler, 1998, p. 1600). What is also problematic is that the hypothesis 
that dysfunctional instincts continue to steer behavior contradicts Posner’s own 
optimism ‘that people can be cured of some of the cognitive quirks and weak-
ness of will with biological roots’ (Posner, 1998, p. 1575). After all, if people can 
unlearn behavior that prevents them from acting rationally with no offsetting 
gains, why then do they continue to show it when it comes to altruism or fairness?
In short, the assumption of the rational actor underlying rational choice theory 
can be upheld only by stretching the concept of instrumental rationality so far 
that it can no longer be distinguished from other types of behavior, by ignoring 
reasons motivating people’s behavior, and by using post hoc explanations or by 
introducing auxiliary assumptions. As such, a response that denounces behavio-
ral law’s criticism on the assumption of the rational actor is problematic.
5. Welcoming Behavioral Law and Economics
There are other lawyer–economists who welcome behavioral law and economics, 
by taking the limitations of the rational actor seriously. This welcoming approach 
focuses on the finding that individuals sometimes obey social norms that are con-
trary to their direct self-interests (for example, Cooter, 1995; Ellickson, 1989; 
Rostain, 2000). Representatives of this position deem attempts insufficient to 
interpret such behavior in terms of instrumental rationality at a deeper level.
One can argue that people voluntarily comply with social norms because they 
want to avoid informal sanctions and because they expect to be rewarded with 
esteem and recognition if they do so. However, subsequently, this argument 
raises the question as to why individuals care to make the effort to punish devi-
ance even though punishing can be costly (Rostain, 2000). After all, it can lead to 
retaliation by the sanction’s target. Again, one could argue that individuals are 
prepared to sanction because they may expect a reward for doing so. However, 
logically one ends up at the question of why this precise behavior is rewarded, 
rather than, for example, encouraging the violation of a social norm:
Even if the motivation to sanction a norm violator might be explained by 
external incentives – people think highly of people who informally sanction 
others for violating norms – the motivation for expressing such approval can-
not, in turn, be reduced to external incentives. The collective action problem, 
solved on the level of primary norm enforcement, reemerges at the next level, 
or, if solved on the secondary level, at the next level after that (Rostain, 2000, 
p. 992).
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According to Cooter (1995), this conundrum cannot be solved by conceiving pref-
erences as given, as is customary in rational choice theory. Preferences them-
selves require explanation. Supposedly, individuals may choose to act unselfishly, 
because of who they want to be. By internalizing values connected to impersonal 
roles, the gap between the self-interest of the agent and the interest of the prin-
cipal reduces, rendering external control superfluous. Internalizing makes sure 
someone adopts shared norms to such an extent that it becomes part of one’s 
self-image. When that happens, a distinction arises between two types of self- 
interest. A thin version looks only to objective payoffs in wealth or power. A thick 
version modifies objective payoffs to encompass the subjective value of morality. 
When actors decide on the basis of a thick self, the cost of violating social norms 
is not loss of esteem in the eyes of peers but guilt or shame for doing something 
the actor experiences as ‘wrong.’ The costs of violating social norms are imposed 
not by society but by the violator herself.
6. Why Welcoming Behavioral Law and Economics Is Incompatible with an 
Integrative Theory of Social Behavior
Cooter and others do not believe that distinguishing between a thin and a thick 
self, or between egoism and altruism, has huge consequences for rational choice 
theory. Supposedly, incremental adaptations inside the rational actor paradigm 
suffice. What is more, incorporating the conceptions of a thick self and of altru-
ism in rational choice theory would even hold the prospect of developing a gen-
eral theory of social behavior (Cooter, 1995; Ellickson, 1989). However, the more 
fundamental the distinction between these types of behaviors is, the more prob-
lematic it becomes, first, to assume that it is instrumental rationality that steers 
individual behavior. After all, acknowledging the existence of a thick self and of 
altruism implies that substantive rationality can also steer individuals’ behavior. 
Second, acknowledging the existence of these types of behavior raises the ques-
tion as to the conditions under which the thin or the thick self, or egoism or altru-
ism prevails (see also Elster, 1986, p. 24). Precisely because rational choice theory 
starts from the assumption of the rational actor, this crucial question cannot 
be raised in this paradigm (see also Schroeder, 2001). In other words, the more 
fundamental the distinction between instrumental rationality and substantive 
rationality is, the more fundamentally the rational choice paradigm is challenged.
Cooter himself, in fact, already recognizes that the distinction between a thin 
and a thick self is crucial, by admitting both selves can be incompatible. A study 
by Lindenbergh and Mascini (2013) can be used to illustrate that the two selves 
can indeed be incompatible. They have studied how victims of personal injuries 
attempt to satisfy their concomitant need for financial compensation and resto-
ration of a harmed relationship with the injurer. The attempt to fulfill both needs 
confronts victims with a double dilemma: on the one hand, a calculative attitude 
of the victim increases the chance of receiving a good financial compensation but 
hampers reconciliation with the injurer. On the other hand, forgiveness promotes 
restoration of the distorted relationship with the injurer but involves the risk of 
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an injurer deploying excuses and admission of guilt in an attempt to lower dam-
ages. This double dilemma generates a game situation in which both the weighing 
of the self-interest and the mutual interest by the victim and the weighing of 
both types of interests attributed to the injurer may vary. ‘Once we recognize 
social interactions as potentially exhibiting a variety of game structures, we must 
acknowledge that a mix of motives operates in human behavior, including coop-
eration, altruism, and self-interest’ (Rostain, 2000, p. 999-1000).
This theoretical matter also has implications for policy making. Perhaps the most 
important implication is that laws that try to offset the inherent utility of non-
compliant behavior with corresponding costs may crowd out substantive rational 
behavior. Studies have shown, for example, that people are more inclined to com-
ply with environmental rules when no sanctions are attached to rule violations 
than when there is the prospect of a small sanction (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999); 
the introduction of small fines for the delay in collecting children from school 
actually produces more, not less, in the way of lateness (Gneezy & Rustichini, 
2000); and people accept the presence of nuclear waste on their city’s land more 
easily when they are not offered compensation than when they are (Frey, 1997). 
What explains these findings is that the presence of a system of rewards and 
punishments signals that individuals are expected to make a cost-benefit analy-
sis, while the absence of such incentives appeals to moral and ethical reasoning. 
This shows that the motivations of actors within institutions are dependent on 
the chosen institutions. Put differently, a motivational assumption may be self- 
fulfilling (Kornhauser, 2002, p. 37/8). Consequently, it can be counterproductive 
to design legal instruments on the basis of the assumption that individuals will 
defect as it may crowd out cooperation.4
In short, lawyer–economists whom welcome behavioral law and economics wrong-
fully assume that distinguishing between a thin and a thick self, or between ego-
ism and altruism or interest/utile and good/justice, can easily be reconciled with 
rational choice theory. These distinctions imply that substantial rationality and 
instrumental rationality have to be taken equally seriously as guiding principles 
of behavior. Consequently, instrumental rationality can no longer be used as the 
sole point of reference, particularly not since it is acknowledged that both types of 
rationality can be incompatible. Moreover, acknowledging that legal instruments 
may alter the preferences that an individual actually has automatically implies 
4 As rightfully pointed out by one referee, under certain conditions it can obviously also be 
counter productive to design legal instruments that are based on the assumption that individu-
als behave substantially rationally. At large-scale cooperation in anonymous groups with large 
potential gains from opportunism and free-riding, it is indeed risky to invoke and rely on vol-
untary cooperation/compliance. My main argument is precisely that it is important to use as 
a starting point of policy making that behavior can be driven by different motives that cannot 
be reduced to a common denominator (see also Kornhauser, 2002, p. 41 and Dagan, Kreitner, 
& Kricheli-Katz, 2018, footnote 16). Besides, focusing on opportunism and free-riding as the 
most important collective action problems rather than, for instance, on the process of acquir-
ing sufficient resources from a certain number of actors from a specific population to achieve 
critical mass that successfully moves forward collective action (Brechin, 2016) by itself demon-
strates a leaning toward a rational choice perspective as it centers on selfish behavior.
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that the stability of preferences can no longer be taken for granted. In other words, 
recognizing the importance of these distinctions automatically implies that two 
pillars underlying rational choice theory – assuming instrumental rationality 
and stable preferences – fail. Consequently, the hope that rational choice theory 
can come up with an integrative theory of social action disappears beyond the 
horizon. As rightfully acknowledged by Ostrom (2010, p. 664), this lack of uni-
versality of rational choice theory is due to the fact that humans have a more com-
plex motivational structure and more capability to solve social dilemmas than it 
assumes. Rational choice’s universal claim of utility maximizing individuals is 
thus to be viewed as yet another chimerical attempt at the universal explanation 
of all phenomena by a single law (Comte, 1983). In sum, also the second response 
to the attack on the assumption of the rational actor is less than convincing.
7. Transcending Behavioral Law and Economics
The conclusion of the previous section is that refuting the idea that preferences 
are stable and fixed is incompatible with the aspiration of coming up with an inte-
grative theory of law and behavior. The third response to the problematization of 
the assumption of the rational actor picks up at the endogeneity of preferences, 
while pleading for an approach that is sensitive to context. Its starting point is 
that preferences are unstable, incoherent, and dependent on context. It is propa-
gated by the economists Hoff and Stiglitz (2016) and is yet to diffuse to law and 
economics.
They argue that whereas in early work in behavioral economics ‘the concept of 
the decision-maker is the quasi-rational actor influenced by the context of the 
moment of decision, in some recent work of behavioral economics, the decision 
maker could be called the enculturated actor’ (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016, p. 25). Based 
on both natural and laboratory experiments, this latter work has demonstrated 
that culture and social context shape how individuals perceive the world, the lens 
through which they see it, and the categories they use to understand and inter-
pret it and that these cultural schemata subsequently help constitute the social 
context from which the schemata emanate in the first place. In order to illus-
trate this mutual interaction between social organization and cultural schemata, 
they refer, for example, to a comparative study of Chinese rice farmers and wheat 
farmers. For their production, rice farmers are more dependent on collaboration 
with other farmers than wheat farmers are on collaboration with other farmers. 
These differences in social organization are reflected in the manner in which these 
farmers conceptualize the world and interact. Differences in conceptualizing the 
world are manifested by the fact that rice farmers are more likely to emphasize 
the holistic relationship between carrots and rabbits, while wheat farmers are 
more inclined to mention the analytical similarity between rabbits and dogs. A 
difference in interaction is exemplified by the fact that the rice provinces had a 
50% lower divorce rate than the wheat provinces in China in 1996.
Hoff and Stiglitz (2016) also refer to a number of studies showing that changes 
in social conditions may also change the cultural schemata on the basis of which 
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people make choices. For example, introducing emancipatory policies in patri-
archal settings such as enrollment of women in savings groups and reserving 
leadership positions for women was shown to not only break down long-standing 
gender barriers but also to change men’s and women’s idea of what it means to be a 
woman. On the basis of these studies, Hoff and Stiglitz conclude that rather than 
the ‘objective’ circumstances, it is the perception thereof that determines people’s 
choices. This implies that identical social circumstances can have multiple equi-
libria that are culturally determined and allow different policy interventions: ‘If 
there is some way to change perceptions, we can change behavior – and possibly 
the equilibrium – without doing much else’ (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016, p. 40).
This third response deviates in two fundamental respects from rational choice 
theory: first, whereas rational choice theory tends to focus on ‘objectively’ 
observable behavior, or revealed preferences, in an attempt to avoid having to 
deal with the interpretation of how people give meaning to their behavior and 
social  surround, the perspective of the encultured rational actor uses meaning-
ful behavior as its starting point of understanding behavioral patterns. Second, 
whereas rational choice theory tries to come up with predictions that are derived 
from the universally applicable assumption of individuals as maximizers of pref-
erences, the third response assumes that individuals’ conceptions of rationality 
shape and are shaped by their social and cultural context.5 These two fundamen-
tal deviations from rational choice theory also have normative implications for 
policy making and research.
In case there are multiple utility functions each of which can change as a result 
of policy, then the choice between utility functions goes beyond the instrumental 
view of economic policy and enters a normative debate about conceptions of the 
good society.
Assume, for instance, that there were a social evolution that led to an equi-
librium in which our selfish self, rather than our other-regarding self, was 
the only one that manifested itself. Could we be non-judgmental about the 
desirability of such an equilibrium in comparison with one that was more 
balanced? (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016, p. 51).
The normative implications for research concern the conceptualization of ration-
ality and the role of the researcher. The early work of behavioral law and economics 
5 Obviously, the two starting points of the enculturated actor approach are commonplace in other 
social sciences such as sociology and anthropology. For example, the first starting point closely 
aligns with Thomas’ well-known sociological theorem ‘If men define situations as real, they are 
real in their consequences,’ while anthropologists are particularly sensitive to the importance of 
context and the role of researchers’ background and identity. The problem is rather that rational 
choice theorists have mostly ignored other disciplines in the belief that economics is the ‘queen’ 
of the social sciences, thereby depreciating and invading different social sciences as inferior 
versus economics. By doing so, contemporary rational choice theorists evidently neglect the 
history of other social sciences (Zafirovski, 2018). Hoff and Stiglitz realize that adopting these 
two starting points unavoidably brings law and economics closer to the other social sciences.
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has focused primarily on documenting whether and how heuristics fall short of 
some correct or optimal answer (Bruch & Feinberg, 2017). This suggests rational-
ity can be measured against a universally applicable standard. The recent work on 
the encultured actor, by contrast, typically shows there is often no such thing as a 
universal metric for the optimality of decisions, since what is meant by that is cul-
turally determined. Rather than more or less biased according to some universal 
standard, decisions are culturally more or less acceptable. Therefore, by branching 
into decision domains in which the quality or optimality of outcomes cannot be 
easily quantified (or in some cases even coherently conceptualized), the distinc-
tion between rational and nonrational decisions becomes less obvious. Heuristics 
or choices that are biased from the perspective of the researcher may, in fact, be 
situationally rational in light of the social circumstances in which the decision 
maker is embedded (Hawkins, 2001). In other words, the conclusion about the 
boundedness of rationality may, in fact, be due to a lack of the researchers’ under-
standing of the context in which the decision maker is embedded. Therefore, ‘[t]
he behavioral researcher is well advised to look carefully at his or her research 
participant’s behavior, beliefs, and goals to discern “the method in the apparent 
madness”’ (Mitchell, 2002, n. 121).
This also implies that it can be important to take into consideration the cultural 
background of the researcher. Empirical research cannot provide incontestable 
or simple answers about legal rationality for prescriptive use: ‘ultimately, the 
choice of behavioral assumptions to guide policy will depend to some extent on 
value preferences and unrealistic or untestable assumptions about human nature’ 
(Mitchell, 2002, p. 76/7, see also Cserne, 2017, p. 322). Posner is also aware of the 
potential importance of researchers’ cultural and political orientations when he 
argues that underlying behavioral law and economics is
the implicit liberal conception of the average person – good, but inept, and for 
both reasons not very responsive to incentives, though perhaps rather plas-
tic. The implicit conservative view of the average person, in contrast, is that 
he is competent but bad; hence conservatives emphasize incentives and con-
straints (Posner, 1998, p. 1559).
These beliefs held by the researcher may also affect their findings. After all, it has 
been established that particularly on ideologically and politically charged topics 
individuals tend to persist in their beliefs in the face of mounting evidence to the 
contrary, no matter what their level of numeracy is (Kahan et al., 2013).
To summarize, the concept of the decision maker as enculturated actor is far 
removed from the assumption of the decision maker as rational actor. Rather, it 
assumes that preferences are flexible, incoherent, and embedded in a social and 
cultural context. Since researchers are part of this context, their cultural back-
ground may reflect the evaluation of behavior as more or less rational. The idea 
that the study of the social and cultural context falls outside the scope of econom-
ics is viewed as a social construction in this third response to the attack on the 
assumption of the rational actor (Bruch & Feinberg, 2017; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016). 
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Although this perspective has yet to diffuse to law and economics, it would force 
lawyer–economists to open up, expand, and stretch even more than has the early 
behavioral law’s empirically founded criticism on the assumption that individu-
als act rationally. This third response cannot only accommodate the empirically 
founded criticism on the assumption of the rational actor, but also offers law and 
economics an opportunity to rise like a phoenix from the ashes.
8. Conclusion
One important reason determining the initial success of law and economics 
was that it provided predictions on how legal sanctions affect behavior, based 
on rational choice theory. In the beginning of the 1950s, Milton Friedman was 
able to cast aside early criticism on the assumption of the rational actor by argu-
ing that ‘the relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not 
whether they are descriptively “realistic,” for they never are, but whether […] they 
yield sufficiently accurate predictions’ (Friedman, 1953, p. 14). As empirical evi-
dence piled up that challenged precisely the accuracy of the predictions derived 
from rational choice theory on how legal sanctions affect behavior, it became 
more difficult for lawyer–economists to ignore the criticism on the assumption of 
the rational actor. Richard Thaler (1992, p. 198), one of the fathers of behavioral 
economics, therefore raised the rhetorical question: ‘would you rather be elegant 
and precisely wrong, or messy and vaguely right?’
This paper has discussed three responses to the criticism of the concept of the 
decision maker as rational actor. The implications for rational choice theory 
increase with each of the responses. Whereas the first response maintains that 
the limitations attributed to the rational actor are grossly exaggerated and can 
easily be incorporated in rational choice theory, the second response welcomes 
the criticism and sees it as an opportunity to come up with an integrative the-
ory of law and behavior. The third response also takes the criticism seriously 
but replaces the aspiration to come up with such an integrative theory with an 
approach that is context sensitive and allows for utility functions that are not 
based on instrumental rationality.
Moreover, it has been argued that the first two responses fall short, while the 
third response offers a promising way to go forward. Defending the assump-
tion of the rational actor is deemed problematic because it can only be saved by 
stretching the concept of instrumental rationality so far that it can no longer be 
distinguished from other types of behavior, by ignoring the reasons people give 
for their own actions, by using post hoc explanations, or by adopting auxiliary 
assumptions. Combining a welcoming response with the ambition to come up 
with a universal theory of law and behavior is also viewed as problematic because 
it is incompatible with accepting the evidence that preferences can be based on 
potentially conflicting types of behavior, which are also changeable. After all, this 
means it can no longer be assumed that it is instrumental rationality that steers 
behavior and that preferences are stable. It also implies that policies based on the 
assumption of instrumentally rational actors can be counterproductive. The third 
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response is argued to be compatible with the empirically founded criticism on 
the assumed rational actor, because it takes into account that preferences can be 
based on different types of behavior allowing for multiple equilibria. Moreover, 
these preferences are viewed as conditional by social circumstances. Therefore, it 
also acknowledges that the assumption of the decision maker as a rational actor 
involves a political choice that excludes opting for policies that are based on alter-
native assumptions about decision makers. However, this last response has yet to 
be adopted by law and economics. Let us hope it will be.
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